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This paper makes suggestions for the next step in CAP reform to complement 
the Bond Scheme proposal (Swinbank & Tangermann, 2000). More precisely it makes 
suggestions about the use of part of the funds that could be released if the CAP reform 
were to follow the Bond Scheme proposal. The proposals discussed here would enhance 
the environmental and rural development programmes (ERDP), the so called “second 
pillar” of CAP. 
 
2. Complementarities between the Bond Scheme proposal and the "second pillar" 
of CAP 
 
 There are two justifications for presenting this paper as a complement to the 
Bond Scheme proposal: 
- the first is related to the direct complementarities between the Bond 
Scheme and the "second pillar" of the CAP: 
o the adoption of a Bond Scheme would release budget funds which 
raises the question of what should be done with that money (Should 
it be retained for continuing support to rural areas and, if yes, for 
what kind of support? Or should support for rural areas be 
discontinued?); 
o the adoption of a Bond Scheme could be resisted by thoseapp aling 
to "rural development"  concerns (risk of increasing land idleness and 
rural desertification);  
- another reason is related to political trade-offs rather than direct 
complementarities between the Bond Scheme proposal and the "second 
pillar" of CAP. 
The issue here is that the discussion of a Bond Scheme, or any other type of 
proposal to change the current system of direct payments, necessarily raises the issue of 
a broader policy reform than the one addressed by those prposals. Rural development 
and environmental issues would almost certainly be a part of that broader framework of 
policy reform. 
                                               
1 The motivation and the contents of this paper owes to the discussions with the other partners during the 
course of the BONDSCHEME project. Special thanks are due to Alan Swinbank for his comments and 
editorial improvements to the previous draft version of the paper. 
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3. Scope of the paper 
 
The Bond Scheme proposal (Swinbank and Tangermann, 2000) acknowledges 
those complementarities and endorses the proposals of the Buckwell Report (Buckwell 
et al., 1997) as appropriate mechanisms to deal with them. Since the purpose of the 
Bond Scheme proposal was not to deal in detail with those c mplementarities it  did not 
go further than endorse the Buckwell Report. Our purpose here is  to elaborate on an 
important issue that is referred to in that  report, bu  not dealt with in detail, which is 
crucial for the type of policy instruments contained in the second pillar of the CAP. 
These are what we will call "voluntary collective action" issues, as mentioned in the 
following passage: 
"A purposeful action programme is required to stimulate the bringing together, 
training and encouragement of local authorities, regional authorities, interest groups 
such as farmers and landowners, and relevant NGOs." (Buckwell et al., 1997, p. 76)    
 
4. Voluntary collective action issues: the "absenteeism problem"  
 
 Voluntary collective action issues have strong ties not only with the contents of 
the CAP’s second pillar (rural development and environmental protection) in itself, but 
also with this pillar viewed in combination with a reform of the first pillar along the 
lines of the Bond Scheme. 
 We will begin by analysing this second issue which we willrefer to as the 
"absenteeism problem". Some people legitimately fear th t a policy reform like the 
Bond Scheme will raise two problems: 
 - one is that it will facilitate the exit of farmers who, in some regions, will not be 
replaced by larger and more efficient farmers, but instead r sult in increasing land 
idleness and more rural desertification; 
 - another problem is that those farmers and landowners i  receipt of bonds who 
decide to sell their land or leave it idle will not be reinvesting those funds in agriculture,  
nor even necessarily in the rural areas. 
 This is what we call the "absenteeism problem". It is an empirical issue to 
determine how serious this problem might be and where is it more likely to arise. To 
undertake this kind of empirical forecasting with a good chan e of anticipating what is 
actually going to happen is not an easy task. However acutethis problem might be, what 
we can say for sure is that the expectations of increasing land idleness and more rural 
desertification resulting from a Bond Scheme exist, and have to be minimized, if one 
wants to make this proposal politically and socially accepted. 
 Since the "absenteeism problem" is a relevant one, why does it involve voluntary 
collective issues? 
 Absenteeism is not an unfortunate genetic and fatal featur  of some farmers and 
rural landowners. If, with the Bond Scheme, they decide to sell their land or to increase 
land idleness it is probably because th y do not expect there will be an attractive 
enough commercial opportunity in which to invest part or all that money in their 
original rural area. Past and current trends of rural desertification in those areas without 
prospects of future rural development initiatives will certainly contribute to raise that 
type of expectations. To create momentum for development and reverse those negative 
expectations, a "growth mentality" has to be engendered, to use Hirschman's words 
(Hirschman, 1958). Such initiatives cannot be limited to scattered individual projects. 
They have to be more comprehensive efforts engaging, in a collective way, individual 
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private entrepreneurship, organised interest groups, and public a thorities at the local, 
regional and central level.    
 The connection between the "absenteeism problem" and voluntary collective 
action is not reduced to the expectation issues mentioned above. There is a more direct 
connection in most of the less favoured rural areas. In these regions we find very often 
the following factors impeding local reinvestment of the income earned by landowners, 
farmers and other people with rural interests: 
 - in many instances rural activities have a relatively small economic size; 
 - there is insufficient provision of services (accounting, technological assistance, 
training, market information, etc.) to the firms at the local level. 
 What has been observed in several regions facing this type of problem is that 
landowners, farmers and other people with rural interests pond positively in terms of 
local reinvestment of their income when they find what we will call here "catalysers of 
voluntary collective action". These catalysers can be very diverse: individuals, NGOs, 
local or regional public authorities, etc. What they have in common is they help local 
people overcome transaction costs in the following domains: 
 - they help small business entrepreneurs to engage in parterships with other 
small businessmen in order to take advantage of economies f scale and scope; 
 - they help to set up services to small businessmen in the domains they need 
most to develop their activities; 
 - they help small businessmen and other local people and institutions build up an 
awareness of their common interests. 
 
5. Voluntary collective action issues: the "multifunctionality problem" 
 
 In the talks about the CAP’s second pillar, and in theagricultural trade 
negotiations, the issue of multifunctionality has taken a prominent position. Agriculture 
is viewed as a joint production  activity of marketable goods and positive externalities 
with a public goods nature.  These public goods include: protection of biodiversity and 
environmental quality, cultural landscape and cultural heritage, viability of rural areas, 
etc. For some people, the fact that these public goods are provided by farmers as a by-
product of their normal farming activities justifies public direct payments to the 
farmers. For those who oppose this type of payments, the argument is that they can be a 
disguised form of continuing farm income support with distorting effects on agricultural 
trade when those payments are not fully decoupled from producti n. Furthermore they 
are paid on a flat-rate basis regardless of whether or not additional costs are incurred by 
individual farmers, or the public goods are in fact supplied. 
 Even though one can find ways to justify production coupled public payments to 
internalise externalities which are not trade distorting, and therefore are WTO compliant 
(Paarlberg et al., 2000), this is not a settled issue. Even if there was agreement at a 
theoretical level on some kind of non trade-distorting environmental payments, the 
practicalities of their design and implementation are not an easy task. Just to mention 
some of them: 
 - the identification of the externalities and public goods to be paid for by society; 
- the need for agreement on common methods of economic valuation of 
agriculture’s environmental services; 
- determination of the marginal costs and benefits of the environmental services 
in order to specify the optimal level of the payments which is contingent on the choice 
of a social welfare function and on the knowledge of the technical relationships between 
farm production and environmental externalities;  
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- monitoring of farmers' compliance with the environmental standards required 
to receive the payments, and the moral hazard problems that migh  arise in this matter, 
etc.   
 Another problem with direct public environmental payments to farmers is that a 
strong case  needs to be made which not only demonstrates h t farmers make more of a 
non-market contribution to social welfare than other producers (Anderson, 2000), but 
also that this contribution cannot be compensated by voluntary  private contributions. 
To settle the first part of this problem involves all the difficulties mentioned before 
about the practicalities of implementing environmental payments to farmers, with the 
same type of problems for assessing the economic value of non-market contributions by 
other producers. 
 We will deal later with the important issue of the existence or non-existence of 
voluntary means to internalise agriculture’s positive externalities. 
 Still another problem with public direct payments is that a case should be made 
to demonstrate that they do not involve "government failures" more serious than the 
market failures they are supposed to correct. Government failures are very likely to arise 
because of the following issues, some of which were already mentioned before: 
 - the "microdecoupling"  (Wolf, Jr., 1993) between the particular group who 
receives the payments (the farmers) and the broadly dispersed group of taxpayers who 
carry their burden; 
 - the difficulty of defining and measuring in a commonly agreed and 
transparent way the output of environmental services to be purchased (Wolf, Jr., 
1993); 
 - moral hazard problems related to monitoring farmers' compliance with  
environmental standards. 
 Most of the theoretical discussion and policy proposals related to 
multifunctionality, including the Buckwell Report's "Environmental and Cultural 
Landscape Payments" (ELCP), are direct public payments aimed at the internalisation 
of externalities. Therefore they face all the problems we raised before. What has 
received much less attention in the theoretical and policy discussions related to 
multifunctionality are voluntary collective action solutions to the internalisation of 
externalities and the production of public goods. What we are suggesting here is simply 
to go back to Ronald Coase's seminal paper (Coase, 1960) calling attention to the 
possibility of internalisation of externalities through private bargaining between 
generators and recipients of externalities when property rights are well defined and 
bargaining costs are low. For this kind of internalisation to be possible public 
intervention might be needed, but it is an indirect intervention much less prone to the 
"government failures" that arise with direct public payments. The indirect public 
interventions which might be needed to facilitate voluntary collective action are the 
following: 
 - laws or other public regulations to define and guarantee property rights to the 
interested parties; 
 - financial and/or technical assistance to "catalysers of voluntary collective 
action" which lower transaction costs of bargaining by helping the private interested 
parties to get together and establish forms of voluntary internalisation of the 
externalities. 
 In the LEADER programme, and in other local development initiatives, there is 
a wide array of successful projects where payments for the protection of environmental 
quality and cultural landscape are being made to institutions providing these services by 
concerned citizens, tourists or other visitors. For these projects to get started the kind of 
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public intervention that was needed was some initial financial or technical assistance 
for creation of those local development associations. The level of this public support 
may decrease over time as these associations become m re able to provide marketable 
services jointly with their services with a public goods nature.  
 To close this discussion, let us sum up the advantages of indirect public 
intervention for the internalisation of externalities through financial and technical 
assistance to voluntary collective action catalysers compared to direct intervention 
through direct payments to farmers: 
 - it can be made WTO compliant more easily than direct payments; 
 - there is no need for the public administration t  evaluate the externalities that 
are going to be internalised; 
 - the "microdecoupling" problem  will be much less severe because those who 
bear the burden of providing environmental and cultural landscape services are mostly 
the same as those who will receive the voluntary contributions and payments for such 
services, and those who benefit from these services are mostly the ones who pay for 
their costs;  
 - the moral hazard problem of complying with the environmental standards is 
much less severe because the voluntary contributions and payments are conditional on 
the contributors and other payers observing that those standards are met. 
 
6. Further arguments in favour of voluntary collective action support 2 
 
 In the previous sections we called attention to the fact that most of what comes 
under the umbrella of CAP’s second pillar has to do with the provision of public goods 
and positive externalities with a public goods nature. Since the efficient provision of 
these kinds of outputs needs some form of collective action (bargaining schemes, 
partnerships, local development associations, producer groups, etc.), we came to the 
conclusion that the support for these forms of organisation should be given an important 
place in the CAP’s second pillar policy mix. 
This proposal implies some substitution of taxpayer (or at least EU Budget) 
funding by "user" or local community funding of rural public goods provision. All 
these "users" do not have to be local. That depends on the geographic level of 
consumption of the public goods (pure or with exclusion): 
- some are local or regional such as forest fire prevention and suppression, 
protection of local watersheds, landslides and avalanche prot ction, soil conservation 
and erosion control, local parks, landscape quality protecti n, microclimate regulation, 
outdoor recreation; 
- others are national like protection of watersheds of national importance, 
national parks; 
- there are also some which are global such as biodiversity protection and global 
warming prevention through forestry, protection of world heritage cultural values. 
 Local public goods provision and internalisation of externalities can be 
appropriately accomplished by instruments such as local taxes, charge systems (user 
fees, pollution and betterment charges, impact fees) or voluntary contributions of local 
users. 
 National or global public goods can be paid through national a d international 
mechanisms which might appeal to taxpayer funding, but also to international donors 
                                               
2 I thank Alan Swinbak whose remarks triggered and inspired this section. 
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and even to some innovative forms of market creation for global public goods provision 
(for example, the markets for carbon sequestration in li e with the Kyoto protocol). 
 Also we should not forget the contributions of farmers and other rural producers 
themselves which can be triggered by those forms of organisation. In fact, it is not rare 
to find in "poor" regions that they are not that poor in terms of financial capital. Often 
local banks have considerable amounts of savings accounts f local residents. What 
those regions lack most is human and social capital of the kind than can be provided 
by local development associations, producer groups, and otherforms of collective 
action. If farmers and other rural producers, instead of coping individually with all the 
barriers to the development of their economic activities in those "poor" regions, can find 
support to have access to knowledge production (research and development) and 
knowledge management activities (technical training, extension, exchanges of 
experiences), appropriate input supplies, easier access to national and international 
markets they may be more willing to reinvest their savings locally instead of placing 
all that money in savings accounts. 
 Finally, it is important to remember the fact that public goods provision may be 
the source of increasing returns to scale, generators of endogenous growth. 
 So, even though our proposal does not have to lead to a total substitution of user 
and local community funding for taxpayer funding, it certainly contributes to lower the 
burden of rural development policy on public budgets and to engender mechanisms 
of endogenous growth. 
 This being said, it is important to note that we don't advocate the total scrapping 
of taxpayer funding of rural development policy. Among the several instances where 
this type of funding is necessary, we would like to point ou two. One may look 
contradictory to what we advocated before. In fact, we think that most of the possible 
forms of organisations for collective action in rural areas need a continuing, 
sustainable and predictable flow of taxpayer funding. In most cases this public 
support should be generous in the initial years of life of those organisations, declining 
after that, as they become more capable of providing marketable services and raising 
private contributions from local, national and international donors. Allocation of public 
funding subject to appropriate monitoring should remain as a safety net justified by the 
public goods nature of some of the outputs of these organisatio . 
 Another reason for taxpayer funding is that in some ore remote regions it 
might take a long time to raise the local demand and the local capital up to the point of 
making those organisations and their members less reliant on public funds.  
 
7. Problems with voluntary collective action 
 
 Even though voluntary collective action for the inter alisation of externalities 
and the provision of public goods has advantages with respect to public direct payments 
to the individual generators of those positive externalities and public goods, it also faces 
serious difficulties in implementation. Some of these difficulties are the following: 
 - voluntary collective action is in itself the production of a public good and 
therefore the "free rider problem"  arises; 
 - when voluntary collective action is structured in the form of a non profit 
organisation, the absence of a market test ogether with  moral hazard problems 
impeding the members from perfectly observing the behaviours f the organisation 
leaders, can be the cause of serious inefficiencies. 
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8. Some recommendations for successful voluntary collective action solutions to the 
"absenteeism problem" and the "multifunctionality problem"  
 
 Olson (1971) has drawn attention to the possibility of generating voluntary 
collective action in the provision of a public good. That c n be done if the organisation 
responsible for that provision jointly provides private services to their members, that is, 
what Olson calls "selective incentives". There are many examples in rural development 
projects where some private organisations (local development associations, producer 
groups, etc.) successfully manage to provide public goods (representation of the 
interests of the members, promotion of the public reputation of some product, etc.) 
combined with the provision of private services (technical assistance to production 
activities, marketing services, etc.) to their members. 
 Other authors (Oliver, Marwell & Teixeira, 1985; Oliver & Marwell, 1988) 
called attention to the fact that if the technology of the production of a public good has 
increasing marginal returns the existence of some start-up contributors will attrac  an 
increasing number of other contributors with lower willingness to pay for the public 
good. One form of useful public intervention in this case could be to provide for those 
start-up contributions which could trigger private contributions afterwards. 
 Drawing on our own research (Mendes, 1998, 2001) on non profit o ganisations 
which jointly provide a public good and private services to their members, like 
Olson's "selective incentives", we can make the following recommendations about the 
conditions that should be met by the organisations targeted for public support (technical 
and/or financial assistance) in the provision of rural public goods: 
 - the organisations should provide not only public goods, but also private 
services ("selective incentives") to their members;    
 - if the members only contribute to the organisation with fixed membership 
fees, independent of the amount of services they get from the organisation, the board of 
directors has a "dominant strategy" (what they decide to do is independent of their 
members’ decisions in operating their private businesses, and therefore there is more 
room for "moral hazard problems" such as directors behaving opportunistically when 
members cannot control well their behaviour) so that the organisation might not be 
successful in stimulating less absenteeism in their members; 
 - to reduce the absenteeism problem one condition that should be met is to 
relate the contributions the members pay to the organisation to the amount of 
private services the organisation provides to them; 
- the condition mentioned above has to be supplemented by the fact that the 
services provided by the organisation to their members should be technically 
complementary (increases the marginal productivity) to the time each member spends 
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